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TRIALS OF

V.

WAR CRIMINALS

TRIALS IN EUROPE
»

Note.
inflicted

—

1.

The

prosecution of

upon the

enemy

persons responsible for acts of violence

civilian populations of occupied countries

was envisaged

in

a Declaration signed at London on 13 January 1942 by representatives of

Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Free France, Greece, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,

Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia.

37 American Journal of International

Law

(1943), p. 84.
2. In 1943, a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes
was established at London, to investigate war crimes against nationals of the
United Nations, to assemble the information available, and to report from time
to time to the Governments concerned.
3. In a conference at Moscow on 30 October 1943, the Foreign Secretaries
of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union,

speaking in the interests of the United Nations, issued a declaration giving
"full

warning" that German

officers

and men and members of the Nazi party

responsible for atrocities, massacres and executions would be sent back to the
countries in which their deeds were done for punishment according to the laws
of those countries.

This declaration was

made without

prejudice to the cases

whose offenses had no particular geographical localization, as it was contemplated that such persons would be punished by the joint
decision of the Governments of the Allies. 38 American Journal of International

of the major criminals

Law

(Supp. 1944), p.

7.

4. On 8 August 1945, the Governments of the United States, France, the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, "acting in the interests of all the United
Nations," concluded an Agreement at London for the establishment, "after
consultation with the Control Council for Germany," of an International Mili-

war criminals whose offenses had no particular geographical localization. Naval War College, International Law Documents 1944-45, p. 249. The Agreement entered into force at once; it was to
continue in force for a period of one year and thereafter subject to termination
by any signatory on one month's notice. The Agreement was open to adherence
by "any Government of the United Nations," and the Governments of the
following 19 states adhered to it: Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.
14 Department of State Bulletin (1946) 261, 954.
5. The Charter annexed to the Agreement of 8 August 1945 set up an International Military Tribunal for the "trial and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis."
Slight errors in the English and French
versions of Article 6, paragraph c, as compared with the Russian version, were
rectified by a protocol signed at Berlin on 6 October 1945. Executive Agreement
Series No. 472.
6. Members of the International Military Tribunal, and alternates, were
appointed by each of the four States signatory to the London Agreement of 8
August 1945. All were civilians except the member and the alternate designated by the Soviet Union. The Tribunal first met at Berlin on 15 October 1945.
7. On 18 October 1945, twenty-four Germans were indicted before the Intertary Tribunal for the trial of certain
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national Military Tribunal, in the

London Agreement.

Each

following counts: 1) a
3)

war crimes;

name

of the four States signatory to the

of the defendants

common

was charged on one or more

of the

plan or conspiracy; 2) crimes against peace;

4) crimes against humanity.

The Tribunal was

also asked to

declare that the Reich Cabinet, various Nazi organizations, and the General

and High

Staff

ment

Command

of the

German Armed Forces were criminal. DepartOne of the defendants (Robert Ley)

of State Publication 2420, p. 23.

having died, twenty-three were arraigned before the Tribunal; the trial of one
defendant (Gustav Krupp) was postponed; and one defendant (Martin Bormann)

was

tried in his absence.

The

8.

trial

August 1946.

at Niirnberg began on 20

The Tribunal

November

1945, and ended

on 31

held 403 open sessions; 33 witnesses were heard

for the prosecution, while 61 witnesses, in addition to nineteen of the defendants,
testified for the defense; 143 additional witnesses

by means

of written answers to interrogatories.

gave evidence for the defense

The Tribunal heard

nesses for organizations, in addition to the evidence taken

22 wit-

by commissioners.

In the judgment rendered on 30 September and

1 October 1946, 19 of the 22
on one or more counts of the
indictment, and three were acquitted. Twelve were sentenced to death by
hanging; one committed suicide, and eleven were executed. Three Nazi organizations and the Secret State Police were declared to have been criminal in

defendants

who came

to trial were found guilty

character.

Though

9.

it

had been contemplated that

in

subsequent proceedings the

International Military Tribunal would proceed to other

ceedings were held
10.

by the Tribunal, and

it

trials,

no such pro-

did not later convene.

made to President Truman on 9 November 1946, Francis
Member of the International Military Tribunal, recommended

In a report

Biddle, American

"that the United Nations as a whole reaffirm the principles of the Niirnberg
Charter in the context of a general codification of offences against the peace and
In reply, President Truman stated that the setting up
"a code of international criminal law to deal with all who wage aggressive
deserves to be studied and weighed by the best legal minds the world
war
over"; and he expressed the hope that the United Nations would carry out Judge
A
Biddle's recommendation.
15 Department of State Bulletin 954-957.
proposal in this sense was made by the American Delegation to the General
Assembly of the United Nations on 15 November 1946. United Nations Document A/C.6/69. On 11 December 1946, the General Assembly took note of the
London Agreement and annexed Charter, as well as the Tokyo Charter, and
security of mankind."

of

.

.

adopted

.

a resolution affirming the principles of international

law recognized

by the Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.
11. On 20 December 1945, by its Law No. 10, the Control Council for Germany provided for national tribunals to be set up in the various zones of
German}- for the trial of persons accused of war crimes. Ordinance No. 7,
adopted by the Military Government for Germany, United States Zone, on 18
October 1946, made provision for tribunals in the United States Zone and set
out the procedure for them to follow.
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Excerpts from the Judgment of the International
Military Tribunal, Ntirnberg, 30 September-1 October
1946

(20)

The International Military Tribunal
nurnberg, germany

Lord Justice Lawrence, Member for the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
President

Mr. Justice Birkett, Alternate Member
Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States
of America
Judge John J. Parker, Alternate Member
M. Le Professeur Donnedieu de Vabres, Member
French Republic
M. Le Conseiller R. Falco, Alternate Member
Major General I. T. Nikitchenko, Member for
for the

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Lieutenant Colonel A.

F.

Volchkov, Alternate

Member
prosecution counsel
Chief Prosecutor for the United States of America:

Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson
Chief Prosecutor for the United

Kingdom

of Great

M. AttorneyGeneral, Sir Hartley Shawcross, K. C, M. P.
Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic: M. Francois de Menthon; M. Auguste Champetier de
Britain and Northern Ireland: H.

Ribes
Chief Prosecutor for the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: General R. A. Rudenko

The United
lic,

States of America, the French

the United

Kingdom

of Great Britain

Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet
Republics

Repuband

Socialist
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against

Hermann Wilhelm
von

Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim
Ribbentrop, Robert Ley, Wilhelm Keitel,

Ernst
Frank,
Funk,
Bohlen
Baldur

Kaltenbrunner,

Rosenberg,

Alfred

Hans

Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter
Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von
und Halbach, Karl Doenitz, Erich Raeder,
von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl,
Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Artur SeyssInquart, Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath,
and Hans Fritzsche, Individually and as Members
of Any of the Following Groups or Organizations
to Which They Respectively Belonged, Namely:
Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); Das Korps

Der

Politischen Leiter

Der

Nationalsozialistischen

Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of
the Nazi Party) Die Schutzstaffeln Der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the "SS") and including Die
Sicherheitsdienst (commonly known as the "SD");
Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police,
commonly known as the "Gestapo") Die Sturmabteilungen Der N. S. D. A. P. (commonly known
as the "SA") and the General Staff and High
;

;

Command
defined

in

of the

German Armed

Appendix

B

the

of

Forces

all

as

Indictment,

defendants.
*

*

*

In Berlin, on the 18th October 1945, in
accordance with Article 14 of the Charter, an indictment was lodged against the defendants named
in the caption above, who had been designated by
the Committee of the Chief Prosecutors of the signa-

tory powers as major war criminals.

A

copy of the indictment in the German language
was served upon each defendant in custody at least
30 days before the trial opened.
.

.

.

—
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The defendant Robert Ley committed
prison on the 25 th October

November

1945.

suicide in

On

the

15th

1945 the Tribunal decided that the de-

fendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach
could not then be tried because of his physical and
mental condition, but that the charges against him
in the indictment should be retained for trial thereafter, if the physical and mental condition of the
defendant should permit. On the 17th November
1945 the Tribunal decided to try the defendant Bormann in his absence under the provisions of Article
12 of the Charter. After argument, and consideration of full medical reports, and a statement from the
defendant himself, the Tribunal decided on the 1st
December 1945 that no grounds existed for a postponement of the trial against the defendant Hess
because of his mental condition. A similar decision
was made in the case of the defendant Streicher.
In accordance with Articles 16 and 23 of the Charter, counsel were either chosen by the defendants in
custody themselves, or at their request were appointed by the Tribunal. In his absence the Tribunal
appointed counsel for the defendant Bormann, and
also assigned counsel to represent the named groups
or organizations.
The trial which was conducted in four languages
English, Russian, French, and German began on
the 20th November 1945, and pleas of "Not guilty"
were made by all the defendants except Bormann.
The hearing of evidence and the speeches of counsel
concluded on 31 August 1946.

—

Four hundred and three open sessions of the Tribunal have been held; 33 witnesses gave evidence
orally

for

the prosecution against the individual

defendants, and 61 witnesses, in addition to 19 of the
defendants, gave evidence for the defense.

A

further 143

witnesses gave evidence for the
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defense

by means

of written answers to interroga-

tories.

The Tribunal appointed commissioners

to hear

evidence relating to the organizations, and 101 witnesses were heard for the defense before the commissioners,

and 1,809

from other witnesses
Six reports were also submitted,
affidavits

were submitted.
summarizing the contents of a great number of further affidavits.

Thirty-eight thousand affidavits, signed

by 155,000

people, were submitted on behalf of the Political

Leaders, 136,213 on behalf of the SS, 10,000 on behalf
of the SA, 7,000 on behalf of the SD, 3,000 on behalf
of the General Staff

and

OKW,

and 2,000 on behalf of

the Gestapo.

The Tribunal itself heard 22 witnesses for the
organizations. The documents tendered in evidence
for the prosecution of the individual defendants

and

the organizations numbered several thousands.

A

complete stenographic record of everything said in
court has been made, as well as an electrical recording
of

all

the proceedings.

Copies of

all

the documents put in evidence

by

the prosecution have been supplied to the defense in
the

German

language.

The

applications

made by

the defendants for the production of witnesses and

documents raised serious problems in some instances,
on account of the unsettled state of the country.
It was also necessary to limit the number of witnesses
to be called, in order to have an expeditious hearing,
in accordance

with Article 18 (c) of the Charter.
The Tribunal, after examination, granted all those
applications which in its opinion were relevant to
the defense of any defendant or named group or
Facilities
organization, and were not cumulative.
were provided for obtaining those witnesses and
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documents granted through the

office of

the General

Secretary established by the Tribunal.
Much of the evidence presented to the Tribunal on
behalf of the prosecution was documentary evidence,

captured by the Allied armies in

German Army

headquarters,

Government

buildings,

and elsewhere.

Some

documents were found

in salt mines,

of the

buried in the ground, hidden behind false walls, and
in other places thought to be secure from discovery.

The

case, therefore, against the defendants rests in a

measure on documents of their own making,
the authenticity of which has not been challenged
except in one or two cases. * * *
For the purpose of showing the background of
the aggressive war and war crimes charged in the
indictment, the Tribunal will begin by reviewing
some of the events that followed the First World
War, and in particular, by tracing the growth of the
Nazi Party under Hitler's leadership to a position of
supreme power from which it controlled the destiny
of the whole German people, and paved the way for
the alleged commission of all the crimes charged
*
*
*
against the defendants.
[The Tribunal
large

,

reviewed the history of the Party's

The Common Plan

rise to

power.]

of Conspiracy and Aggressive

War
The Tribunal now

turns to the consideration of

the crimes against peace charged in the indictment.

Count one

of the indictment charges the defendants

with conspiring or having a
crimes against peace.

common

Count two

plan to commit

of the indictment

defendants with committing specific
crimes against peace by planning, preparing, in-

charges

the

itiating,

and waging wars of aggression against a

number

of other States.

It will

be convenient to

consider the question of the existence of a

common
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plan and the question of aggressive war together,
and to deal later in this judgment with the question
of the individual responsibility of the defendants.
The charges in the indictment that the defendants

planned and waged aggressive wars are charges of the
utmost gravity. War is essentially an evil thing.
Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent
states alone, but affect the whole world.
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not
only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes
in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil
of the whole.

The

first

acts of aggression referred to in the in-

dictment are the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia; and the first war of aggression charged in the
indictment is the war against Poland begun on the

September 1939.
Before examining that charge it is necessary to
look more closely at some of the events which pre1st

ceded these acts of aggression. The war against
Poland did not come suddenly out of an otherwise
clear sky; the evidence has made it plain that this
war of aggression, as well as the seizure of Austria
and Czechoslovakia, was premeditated and carefully
prepared, and was not undertaken until the moment
was thought opportune for it to be carried through
as a definite part of the preordained scheme and plan.

For the aggressive designs of the Nazi Government
were not accidents arising out of the immediate
political situation in Europe and the world; they were
a deliberate and essential part of Nazi foreign policy.
From the beginning, the National Socialist movement claimed that its object was to unite the German
people in the consciousness of their mission and
destiny, based on inherent qualities of race, and under
the guidance of the Fuehrer.
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achievement, two things were deemed to be
essential: The disruption of the European order as
it had existed since the Treaty of Versailles, and the
creation of a Greater Germany beyond the frontiers
of 1914.
This necessarily involved the seizure of

For

its

foreign territories.

War was

seen to be inevitable, or at the very least,

highly probable,

complished.

if

these purposes were to be ac-

The German

people,

therefore,

with

were to be organized as a great
political-military army, schooled to obey without
*
*
*
question any policy decreed by the State.
[The Tribunal reviewed at length German preparation for aggression, the seizures of Austria and
all

their resources,

Czechoslovakia, the aggression against Poland, the

Denmark, Norway, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Yugoslavia, Greece,
and the U. S. S. R., and the commencement of war
successive invasions of

against the United States.]

Violations of International Treaties

The Charter
waging

of

defines as a crime the planning or

war that

is

a

war

of aggression or a

violation of international treaties.

war

in

The Tribunal has

decided that certain of the defendants planned and
waged aggressive wars against 10 nations, and were
therefore guilty of this series of crimes.

This makes

unnecessary to discuss the subject in further detail,
or even to consider at any length the extent to which
these aggressive wars were also "wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, or assurances."
These treaties are set out in appendix C of the indictment. Those of principal importance are the following
it

:

(A)

HAGUE CONVENTIONS

In the 1899 Convention the signatory powers
agreed: "before an appeal to arms ... to have re-
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course, as far as circumstances allow, to the good

mediation of one or more friendly powers."
A similar clause was inserted in the Convention for
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1907.
In the accompanying Convention Relative to Openoffices or

ing of Hostilities, article
specific

I

contains this far

more

language:

"The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between
them must not commence without a previous and explicit warnform of either a declaration of war, giving reasons,
or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war."
ing, in the

Germany was

a party to these conventions.
(B)

VERSAILLES TREATY

Breaches of certain provisions of the Versailles
Treaty are also relied on by the prosecution not to
fortify the left bank of the Rhine (art. 42-44): to
"respect strictly the independence of Austria" (art.

—

80); renunciation of

and the Free City of

any rights in Memel (art. 99)
Danzig (art. 100); the recogni-

tion of the independence of the Czecho-Slovak State;

and the Military, Naval, and Air Clauses against
German rearmament found in part V. There is no
doubt that action was taken by the German Govern-

ment contrary

to

all

these provisions, the details of

which are set out in appendix C. With regard to
the Treaty of Versailles, the matters relied on are:
1. The violation of articles 42 to 44 in respect of
the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.
2.

The annexation

of Austria

on the 13th March

1938, in violation of aticle 80.

The incorporation
the 22d March 1939, in
4. The incorporation
3.

on the
5.

1st

The

of the district of

Memel on

violation of article 99.
of the Free City of

September 1939,

Danzig

in violation of article 100.

incorporation of the provinces of

Bohemia
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and Moravia on the 16th March 1939,

in violation of

article 81.

The

6.

repudiation of the military, naval and air

March of 1935.
Germany announced that,

clauses of the treaty, in or about

On

the 21st

May

1935,

whilst renouncing the disarmament clauses of the

would still respect the territorial limitaand would comply with the Locarno Pact.

treaty, she
tions,

(With regard to the first five breaches alleged, therefore, the Tribunal finds the allegation proved.)
TREATIES OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE, ARBITRATION,
AND NON-AGGRESSION

(C)

unnecessary to discuss in any detail the various treaties entered into by Germany with other
powers. Treaties of Mutual Guarantee were signed
by Germany at Locarno in 1925, with Belgium,
France, Great Britain, and Italy, assuring the maintenance of the territorial status quo. Arbitration
treaties were also executed by Germany at Locarno
with Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Poland.
It

is

Article I of the latter treaty

is

typical, providing:

"All disputes of every kind between

Germany and Poland

which it may not be possible to settle amicably
by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for
."
decision to an arbitral tribunal
*

*

*

.

.

Conventions of arbitration and conciliation were
entered into between Germany, the Netherlands,
and Denmark in 1926; and between Germany and
Luxemburg in 1929. Nonaggression treaties were
executed by Germany with Denmark and Russia in
1939.
(D)

The Pact

KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT

of Paris

was signed on the 27th August

1928 by Germany, the United States, Belgium,
France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, and
777534—48

17
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other countries; and subsequently

The Tribunal
of this Pact

has

and

made

full

by other powers.

reference to the nature

another part of this
judgment. It is therefore not necessary to discuss
the matter further here, save to state that in the
opinion of the Tribunal this pact was violated by

Germany

its legal effect in

in all the cases of aggressive

in the indictment.

It

is

war charged

to be noted that

on the 26th

January 1934, Germany signed a Declaration for the
Maintenance of Permanent Peace with Poland,
which was explicitly based on the Pact of Paris, and
in which the use of force was outlawed for a period
of 10 years.

The Tribunal
any

does not find

it

necessary to consider

of the other treaties referred to in the appendix,

or the repeated agreements and assurances of her
peaceful intentions entered into
(B)

The

by Germany.

THE LAW OF THE CHARTER

jurisdiction of the Tribunal

is

defined in the

Agreement and Charter, and the crimes coming
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, for which
there shall be individual responsibility, are set out in
Article 6.

The law

of the Charter

is

decisive,

and

binding upon the Tribunal.
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the
sovereign legislative power

the

German Reich

by the

countries to which

unconditionally surrendered; and

the undoubted right of these countries to legislate

been recognized by
The Charter is not an arbitrary

for the occupied territories has

the civilized world.

power on the part of the victorious nations,
the view of the Tribunal, as will be shown, it

exercise of

but
is

in

the expression of international law existing at the

time of

its

creation;

and to that extent

is itself

a con-

tribution to international law.

The Signatory Powers

created this Tribunal, de-
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fined the law

was to administer, and made regula-

it

tions for the proper conduct of the trial.

In doing

they have done together what any one of
them might have done singly; for it is not to be
doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up
With regard to
special courts to administer law.
the constitution of the court, all that the defendants
are entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on the
so,

facts

and law.

The Charter makes
war

of aggression or a

the planning or waging of a

war

in violation of interna-

and it is therefore not strictly
necessary to consider whether and to what extent
aggressive war was a crime before the execution of
But in view of the great
the London Agreement.
tional treaties a crime;

importance of the questions of law involved, the
Tribunal has heard full argument from the prosecution and the defense, and will express its view on the
matter.

was urged on behalf of the defendants that a
fundamental principle of all law international and
domestic is that there can be no punishment of
crime without a preexisting law. "Nullum crimen
sine lege, nulla poena sine lege."
It was submitted
that ex post facto punishment is abhorrent to the law
of all civilized nations, that no sovereign power had
made aggressive war a crime at the time the alleged
criminal acts were committed, that no statute had
defined aggressive war, that no penalty had been
fixed for its commission, and no court had been
created to try and punish offenders.
It

—

—

In the

first place,

maxim nullum
assert that

is

crimen sine

sovereignty, but

To

it

is

to be observed that the
lege

is

not a limitation of

in general a principle of justice.

it is

unjust to punish those

who

in

defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked

neighboring states without warning

is

obviously un-

—
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true, for in such circumstances the attacker

know

that he

must

doing wrong, and so far from it being
unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong
were allowed to go unpunished. Occupying the
positions they did in the government of Germany,
the defendants, or at least some of them must have

known

is

of the treaties signed

war

recourse to

by Germany, outlawing

for the settlement of international

must have known that they were

disputes; they

acting in defiance of

all

international law

when

in

complete deliberation they carried out their designs
of invasion and aggression.
On this view of the
case alone, it would appear that the maxim has no
application to the present facts.

This view

strongly reinforced

is

by

a consideration

of the state of international law in 1939, so far as

war

aggressive

is

concerned.

Renunciation of

for the

known

The General Treaty

War of August 27,

1928,

more

Pact of Paris or the KelloggBriand Pact, was binding on 63 nations, including
Germany, Italy, and Japan at the outbreak of war
generally

as the

In the preamble, the signatories declared

in 1939.

that they were
"Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare
of mankind; persuaded that the time has come when a frank
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should
be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now
existing between their peoples should be perpetuated ... all
changes

by

in their relations

pacific

in a

means

common

tional policy

The

first

.

.

.

with one another should be sought only

thus uniting civilized nations of the world

renunciation of war as an instrument of their na.

.

two

."

articles are as follows:

"Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare
in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and
renounce

it

as

an instrument of national policy

to one another."

in their relations
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"Article

II.

The High Contracting Parties

tlement or solution of

all

agree that the set-

disputes or conflicts of whatever nature

may

or of whatever origin they

be,

which

may

among

arise

them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

The

question

The

pact?
to

is,

what was the

nations

who

legal effect of this

signed the pact or adhered

unconditionally condemned recourse to war

it

and expressAfter the signing of the pact, any
ly renounced it.
nation resorting to war as an instrument of national

for the future as an instrument of policy,

In the opinion of the Tribu-

policy breaks the pact.
nal, the

solemn renunciation of war as an instrument

of national policy necessarily involves the proposition

that such a war

that those

who

is

illegal in international

law; and

plan and wage such a war, with

its

inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing

a crime in so doing.

War

for the solution of inter-

national controversies undertaken as an instrument
of national policy certainly includes a
sion,

and such a war

pact.

is

war

of aggres-

by the

therefore outlawed

As Mr. Henry L. Stimson, then Secretary

of

State of the United States, said in 1932:

"War between

nations was renounced

by the

signatories of the

This means that it has become throughout practically the entire world ... an illegal thing. Hereafter, when engaged in armed conflict, either one or both of them
We
must be termed violators of this general treaty law
Kellogg-Briand Treaty.

.

.

.

denounce them as law breakers."

But

argued that the pact does not expressly
enact that such wars are crimes, or set up courts to
try those who make such wars. To that extent the
same is true with regard to the laws of war contained
The Hague Convention
in the Hague Convention.
of 1907 prohibited resort to certain methods of waging
war. These included the inhumane treatment of
prisoners, the employment of poisoned weapons, the
improper use of flags of truce, and similar matters.
it is
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Many

had been enforced long
before the date of the Convention; but since 1907
they have certainly been crimes, punishable as offenses against the laws of war; yet the Hague Convention nowhere designates such practices as criminal,
nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any mention made
For many
of a court to try and punish offenders.
years past, however, military tribunals have tried
and punished individuals guilty of violating the rules
of these prohibitions

down by this Convention. In the
Tribunal, those who wage aggressive

of land warfare laid

opinion of the

war

which is equally illegal, and of
much greater moment than a breach of one of the
rules of the Hague Convention.
In interpreting
the words of the pact, it must be remembered that
international law is not the product of an international legislature, and that such international agreements as the Pact of Paris have to deal with general
principles of law, and not with administrative matters
of procedure.
The law of war is to be found not
only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of
states which gradually obtained universal recognition,
and from the general principles of justice applied
by jurists and practiced by military courts. This
law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows
the needs of a changing world. Indeed, in many
cases treaties do no more than express and define
for more accurate reference the principles of law
are doing that

already existing.

The view which

the Tribunal takes of the true

supported by the international history which preceded it.
In the year
1923 the draft of a Treaty of Mutual Assistance
was sponsored by the League of Nations. In Article
I the treaty declared "that aggressive war is an ininterpretation of the pact

is
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and that the parties would
"undertake that no one of them will be guilty of
The draft treaty was submitted
its commission."
to twenty-nine states, about half of whom were in
ternational

crime,"

favor of accepting the text.

The

principal objection

appeared to be in the difficulty of defining the acts
which would constitute "aggression," rather than
any doubt as to the criminality of aggressive war.
The preamble to the League of Nations 1924 Protocol
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,

("Geneva Protocol"),
ity of the

members

declared that "a

after "recognising the solidar-

of the international

war

of

violation of this solidarity

crime."

It

community,"

aggression constitutes a

and

is

an international

went on to declare that the contracting

parties were "desirous of facilitating the complete

application of the system provided in the

Covenant

League of Nations for the pacific settlement
of disputes between the states and of ensuring the
of the

repression of international crimes."

The

Protocol

was recommended to the members of the League of
Nations by a unanimous resolution in the Assembly
of the 48 members of the League. These members
included Italy and Japan, but Germany was not
then a

member

of the League.

Although the Protocol was never
signed

by the

ratified, it

was

leading statesmen of the world, re-

presenting the vast majority of the civilized States

and peoples, and

may

be regarded as strong evidence
of the intention to brand aggressive war as an international crime.

At

the meeting of the Assembly of the League of

Nations on the 24th September 1927, all the delegations then present (including the German, the
Italian, and the Japanese), unanimously adopted a
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concerning

declaration

wars

of

The

aggression.

preamble to the declaration stated:
"The Assembly: Recognizing the solidarity which unites the
community of nations;
Being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance of general
peace;

Being convinced that a war of aggression can never serve as
a means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence
an international crime * * *."

The unanimous

resolution of the 18th February

American republics at the sixth (Havana)
Pan-American Conference, declared that "war of
1928, of 21

aggression constitutes an international crime against

the

human

species."

All these expressions of opinion, and others that

could be cited, so solemnly made, reinforce the construction which the Tribunal placed
of Paris, that resort to a

merely

illegal,

aggressive

but

is

war

criminal.

upon the Pact

of aggression

The

its

not

prohibition of

war demanded by the conscience

world, finds

is

of the

expression in the series of Pacts and

Treaties to which the Tribunal has just referred.

important to remember that Article 227
of the Treaty of Versailles provided for the conIt

is

also

composed of representatives of five of the Allied and Associated Powers
which had been belligerents in the First World War
opposed to Germany, to try the former German
Emperor "for a supreme offence against international
morality and the sanctity of treaties." The purpose
of this trial was expressed to be "to vindicate the
stitution of a special tribunal,

solemn obligations of international undertakings,
In
and the validity of international morality."
Article 228 of the Treaty, the German Government
expressly recognized the right of the Allied Powers
"to bring before military tribunals persons accused
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committed acts in violation of the laws
and customs of war."
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the actions of sovereign States, and
provides no punishment for individuals; and further,
that where the act in question is an act of State, those
who carry it out are not personally responsible, but
of having

are protected

by the doctrine

of the sovereignty of

In the opinion of the Tribunal, both
these submissions must be rejected. That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon states has long been rethe State.

In the recent case of Ex parte Quirin
(1942, 317 U. S. 1), before the Supreme Court of the
United States, persons were charged during the war
cognized.

with landing in the United States for purposes of
spying and sabotage. The late Chief Justice Stone,
speaking for the court, said:
"From

the very beginning of

its

history this Court has applied

the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which
prescribes for the conduct of war, the status, rights,

of

enemy

nations as well as

He went

on to give a

enemy

list

and duties

individuals."

of cases tried

by the

courts,

where individual offenders were charged with offences
against the laws of nations, and particularly the
laws of war. Many other authorities could be cited,
but enough has been said to show that individuals
can be punished for violations of international law.
Crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing

who commit

such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.
individuals

The

provisions of Article 228 of the Treaty of

Versailles already referred to illustrate
this

and enforce

view of individual responsibility.

The

principle of international law,

certain circumstances, protects

which under

the representatives

:
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of a

cannot be applied to acts which are

State,

condemned
authors

as criminal

these

of

acts

by

international law.

cannot

shelter

The

themselves

behind their official position in order to be freed
from punishment in appropriate proceedings. Article 7 of the Charter expressly declares:
"The

position of defendants, whether as heads of State,

official

or responsible

considered as

government departments, shall not be
freeing them from responsibility, or mitigating

officials in

punishment."

On
is

the other hand the very essence of the Charter

that individuals have international duties which

transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State. He who violates the
laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in

pursuance of the authority of the State
in authorizing action

moves outside

its

if

the State

competence

under international law.
It was also submitted on behalf of most of these
defendants that in doing what they did they were
acting under the orders of Hitler, and therefore
cannot be held responsible for the acts committed
by them in carrying out these orders. The Charter
specifically provides in Article 8

"The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility,

The

but

may

be considered

in mitigation of

punishment."

provisions of this Article are in conformity with

the law of

all

nations.

That

a soldier

was ordered

or torture in violation of the international law

to

kill

of

war has never been recognized

as a defense to such

acts of brutality, though, as the Charter here pro-

may

be urged in mitigation of the
punishment. The true test, which is found in varying
degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not the
existence of the order, but whether moral choice was

vides, the order

in fact possible.
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The Law

as to the

Common Plan or Conspiracy

In the previous recital of the facts relating to
aggressive war, it is clear that planning and preparation had been carried out in the

way

most systematic

at every stage of the history.

Planning and preparation are essential to the making of war. In the opinion of the Tribunal aggressive
war is a crime under international law. The Charter
defines this offense as planning, preparation, initiation, or

pation in

waging of a war of aggression "or
a

common

partici-

plan or conspiracy for the

accomplishment ... of the foregoing." The indictment follows this distinction. Count one charges the
common plan or conspiracy. Count two charges the
planning and waging of war. The same evidence has
been introduced to support both counts. We shall
therefore discuss both counts together, as they are in
substance the same.
The defendants have been
charged under both counts, and their guilt under
each count must be determined.

The "common plan

or conspiracy" charged in the

indictment covers 25 years, from the formation of
the Nazi Party in 1919 to the end of the war in 1945.
The party is spoken of as "the instrument of cohesion
among the defendants" for carrying out the purposes
of the conspiracy
the overthrowing of the Treaty of
Versailles, acquiring territory lost by Germany in the
last war and "lebensraum" in Europe, by the use, if
necessary, of armed force, of aggressive war. The
"seizure of power" by the Nazis, the use of terror,
the destruction of trade unions, the attack on
Christian teaching and on churches, the persecution
of the Jews, the regimentation of youth
all these
are said to be steps deliberately taken to carry out
the common plan.
It found expression, so it is
alleged, in secret rearmament, the withdrawal by
Germany from the Disarmament Conference and the

—

—
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League of Nations, universal military
seizure of the Rhineland.

and

service,

Finally, according to the

indictment, aggressive action was planned and carried

out against Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1936-38,
followed by the planning and waging of war against
Poland; and, successively, against ten other countries.
The prosecution says, in effect, that any significant
participation in the affairs of the Nazi Party or
government is evidence of a participation in a
conspiracy that is in itself criminal. Conspiracy is
not defined in the Charter. But in the opinion of the
Tribunal the conspiracy must be clearly outlined in
It must not be too far removed
its criminal purpose.
from the time of decision and of action. The planning, to be criminal, must not rest merely on the
declarations of a party program, such as are found in
the 25 points of the Nazi Party, announced in 1920,
or

the

Kampf"

political

affirmations

in later years.

The

expressed

"Mein

in

must examine
wage war existed, and
tribunal

whether a concrete plan to
determine the participants in that concrete plan.
It is not necessary to decide whether a single master
conspiracy between the defendants has been established by the evidence. The seizure of power by the
Nazi Party, and the subsequent domination by the
Nazi State of all spheres of economic and social life
must of course be remembered when the later plans
for waging war are examined.
That plans were

made

to

wage wars,

and probably before
after,

as early as
that,

is

November

5,

1937,

And therein many directions,

apparent.

such preparations continued

and against the peace of many countries. Indeed
the threat of war and war itself if necessary was
an integral part of the Nazi policy. But the evidence

—

—

with certainty the existence of many
separate plans rather than a single conspiracy embracing them all. That Germany was rapidly moving
establishes
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to complete dictatorship from the

moment

that the

Nazis seized power, and progressively in the direction
of war, has been overwhelmingly shown in the ordered
sequence of aggressive acts and wars already set out
in this judgment.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the evidence
establishes the common planning to prepare and

wage war by certain
rial

of the defendants.

It

is

immate-

to consider whether a single conspiracy to the

extent and over the time set out in the indictment

has been conclusively proved. Continued planning,
with aggressive war as the objective, has been estab-

beyond doubt. The truth of the situation was
well stated by Paul Schmidt, official interpreter of
lished

the

German Foreign

"The

Office, as follows:

general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent

namely the domination of the European Continent, to be achieved first by the incorporation of all Germanspeaking groups in the Reich, and, secondly, by territorial expansion under the slogan "Lebensraum." The execution of these
basic objectives, however, seemed to be characterized by
improvisation.
Each succeeding step was apparently carried
from the

start,

out as each

new

situation arose, but

all

consistent with the

ultimate objectives mentioned above."

The argument

common

planning cannot
exist where there is complete dictatorship is unsound.
A plan in the execution of which a number of persons
participate is still a plan, even though conceived by
only one of them; and those who execute the plan do
not avoid responsibility by showing that they acted
under the direction of the man who conceived it.
Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself.
He had to have the cooperation of statesmen, military
leaders, diplomats, and businessmen.
When they,
with knowledge of his aims, gave him their cooperation, they made themselves parties to the plan he had
initiated.
They are not to be deemed innocent
because Hitler made use of them, if they knew what
that such
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That they were assigned to their
tasks by a dictator does not absolve them from
responsibility for their acts. The relation of leader
they were doing.

and follower does not preclude responsibility here
any more than it does in the comparable tyranny
of organized domestic crime.

Count

one, however, charges not only the con-

commit aggressive war, but

commit
war crimes and crimes against humanity. But the
Charter does not define as a separate crime any
conspiracy except the one to commit acts of aggressive
spiracy to

war.

also to

Article 6 of the Charter provides

:

"Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a

common

plan or

conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible
for

all

acts performed

by any persons

in

execution of such

plan."

In the opinion of the Tribunal, these words do not
add a new and separate crime to those already listed.

The words

are designed to establish the responsibility

of persons participating in a

common

plan.

The

Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges in
count one that the defendants conspired to commit
war crimes and crimes against humanity, and will
consider only the common plan to prepare, initiate,
and wage aggressive war.

War

Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

The

evidence relating

to

war crimes has been

volume and its detail. It is
impossible for this judgment adequately to review it,
or to record the mass of documentary and oral
overwhelming, in

its

evidence that has been presented.

The

truth remains

that war crimes were committed on a vast scale,
never before seen in the history of war. They were
perpetrated in

all

and on the high

by Germany,
and were attended by every

the countries occupied
sea.s,
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circumstance of cruelty and horror.
There can be no doubt that the majority of them
arose from the Nazi conception of "total war,"
with which the aggressive wars were waged. For in
conceivable

war" the moral ideas
underlying the conventions which seek to make war
more humane are no longer regarded as having force
this

conception

of

"total

Everything is made subordinate to the
overmastering dictates of war. Rules, regulations,
assurances, and treaties, all alike, are of no moment;
and so, freed from the restraining influence of international law, the aggressive war is conducted by the
Nazi leaders in the most barbaric way. Accordingly,
war crimes were committed when and wherever the
Fuehrer and his close associates thought them to be advantageous. They were for the most part the result
of cold and criminal calculation.
On some occasions war crimes were deliberately
planned long in advance. In the case of the Soviet
Union, the plunder of the territories to be occupied,
and the ill-treatment of the civilian population, were
settled in minute detail before the attack was begun.
or validity.

As early

as the

autumn

of 1940, the invasion of the

Union was being considered.
From that date onwards, the methods to be employed
territories of the Soviet

in destroying all possible opposition

were continu-

ously under discussion.
Similarly,

when planning

to exploit the inhabitants

of the occupied countries for slave labor

greatest scale, the

German Government

on the very
conceived

it

an integral part of the war economy, and planned
and organized this particular war crime down to the

as

last elaborate detail.

Other war crimes, such as the murder of prisoners
of war who had escaped and been recaptured, or the

murder

of

commandos

or captured airmen, or the

destruction of the Soviet commissars, were the result

:
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of direct orders circulated through the highest official

channels.

The Tribunal

proposes, therefore, to deal quite

generally with the question of
refer to

them

later

war

when examining the

of the individual defendants in

Prisoners of

crimes, and to

war were

murdered, not only

ill-treated

responsibility

relation

to them.

and tortured and

in defiance of the well-established

but

complete disregard
of the elementary dictates of humanity.
Civilian
populations in occupied territories suffered the same
Whole populations were deported to Germany
fate.
for the purposes of slave labor upon defense works,
armament production and similar tasks connected
with war effort. Hostages were taken in very large
numbers from the civilian populations in all the
occupied countries, and were shot as suited the German purposes. Public and private property was
systematically plundered and pillaged in order to
enlarge the resources of Germany at the expense of
the rest of Europe. Cities and towns and villages
were wantonly destroyed without military justificarules of international law,

in

tion or necessity.

MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF

(A)

WAR
Article 6 (b) of the Charter defines

war crimes

in

these words

"War
war.

Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,

any other puroccupied territory, murder

ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for

pose of civilian population of or in

war or persons on the

seas, killing

of hostages, plunder of public or private property,

wanton de-

or ill-treatment of prisoners of

struction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified

by

military necessity."

In the course of the war, many Allied soldiers who
had surrendered to the Germans were shot immedi-
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often as a matter of deliberate,

ately,

On

policy.

the 18th October 1942, the defendant

Keitel circulated a directive authorized

by

Hitler,

members of Allied "comwhen in uniform and whether

which ordered that

mando"

calculated

all

units, often

armed or not, were to be "slaughtered to the last
man," even if they attempted to surrender. It was
further provided that if such Allied troops came into
the hands of the military authorities after being

first

captured by the local police, or in any other way,
they should be handed over immediately to the SD.
This order was supplemented from time to time, and
was effective throughout the remainder of the war,
although after the Allied landings in Normandy in
1944 it was made clear that the order did not apply
to "commandos" captured within the immediate
battle area.
Under the provisions of this order,

"commando"

and other military units
operating independently, lost their lives in Norway,
France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. Many of them
were killed on the spot, and in no case were those
who were executed later in concentration camps ever
given a trial of any kind. For example, an American
military mission which landed behind the German
front in the Balkans in January 1945, numbering
about 12 to IS men and wearing uniform, were taken
to Mauthausen under the authority of this order,
and according to the affidavit of Adolf Zutte, the

Allied

troops,

adjutant of the Mauthausen Concentration
all

of

them were

Camp,

shot.

OKH

In March 1944 the
issued the "Kugel" or
"Bullet" decree, which directed that every escaped
officer and NCO prisoner of war who had not been
put to work, with the exception of British and American prisoners of war, should on recapture be handed
over to the SIPO and SD. This order was distributed
777534

—

i8

18
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by the SIPO and SD

These

to their regional offices.

escaped officers and NCOs were to be sent to the
concentration camp at Mauthausen, to be executed
upon arrival, by means of a bullet shot in the neck.
In March 1944, 50 officers of the British Royal
Air Force, who escaped from the camp at Sagan
where they were confined as prisoners, were shot on

on the direct orders of Hitler. Their
bodies were immediately cremated, and the urns containing their ashes were returned to the camp. It
was not contended by the defendants that this was
other than plain murder, in complete violation of
recapture,

international law.

When Allied airmen were
many they were sometimes
civilian population.

The

forced to land in Gerkilled

at once

by the

police were instructed not

to interfere with these killings, and the Ministry of
Justice was informed that no one should be prose-

cuted for taking part in them.

The treatment

of

Soviet prisoners of

war was

by particular inhumanity. The death
many of them was not due merely to the action

characterized
of so

of individual guards, or to the exigencies of

camps.
murder.

It

was the

More than

invasion of

life in

result of systematic plans

the
to

month before the German
the Soviet Union the OKW were making
a

special plans for dealing with political representa-

armed forces who might
proposal was that "political

tives serving with the Soviet

be

One

captured.

Commissars

of

the

army

are

not

recognized

as

prisoners of war, and are to be liquidated at the
latest in the transient prisoner of

war camps."

The

defendant Keitel gave evidence that instructions
incorporating this proposal were issued to the German army.
On the 8th September 1941, regulations for the
treatment of Soviet prisoners of war in all prisoner
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war camps were issued, signed by General Reinecke,
the head of the prisoner of war department of the
high command. These orders stated:

of

"The Bolshevist

soldier has therefore lost all claim to

treatment as an honorable opponent, in accordance with
*
*
*
The order for ruthless
the Geneva Convention
and energetic action must be given at the slightest indication of insubordination, especially in the case of Bolshe-

Insubordination, active or passive resist-

vist fanatics.

ance,

must be broken immediately by

nets,

butts, and firearms)

the order

who

*

*

force of

arms (bayo-

Anyone carrying out

*

does not use his weapons, or does so with

insufficient energy,

is

*

punishable

*

*

Prisoners of

war attempting escape are to be fired on without previous
challenge.
No warning shot must ever be fired * * *
The use of arms against prisoners of war is as a rule legal."

The

war were

without suitable
clothing; the wounded without medical care; they
were starved, and in many cases left to die.
On the 17th July 1941, the Gestapo issued an
Soviet prisoners of

order providing for the killing of
of

left

all

Soviet prisoners

war who were or might be dangerous
*

Socialism.

to National

*

*

In some cases Soviet prisoners of war were branded

with a special permanent mark. There was put in
order dated the 20th July 1942,
evidence the

OKW

which

laid

down

"The brand

is

that:

to take the shape of an acute angle of about 45

cm. in length, pointing upbuttock * * * This brand is

degrees, with the long side to be

1

wards and burnt on the left
made with the aid of a lancet available
The coloring used is Chinese ink."

The

in

any military

unit.

carrying out of this order was the responsibility

was widely
the SIPO and the SD to

of the military authorities,

circulated

German

by the

chief of

though

it

police officials for information.

Soviet prisoners of war were also
of medical experiments of the

made

most

the subject

cruel

and

in-
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human

In July 1943, experimental work was
begun in preparation for a campaign of bacteriological
warfare; Soviet prisoners of war were used in these
kind.

medical experiments, which more often than not
proved fatal. In connection with this campaign for
bacteriological warfare, preparations were also

made

from planes,
with the object of producing widespread failures of
crops and consequent starvation. These measures
were never applied, possibly because of the rapid
deterioration of Germany's military position.
The argument in defense of the charge with regard
to the murder and ill-treatment of Soviet prisoners
of war, that the USSR was not a party to the Geneva
Convention, is quite without foundation. On the
15th September 1941, Admiral Canaris protested
for the spreading of bacterial emulsions

against the regulations for the treatment of Soviet

by General Reinecke on the

prisoners of war, signed

8th September 1941.

He

"The Geneva Convention
war

is

the

USSR.

then stated:

for the treatment of prisoners of

not binding in the relationship between

Germany and

Therefore only the principles of general inter-

national law on the treatment of prisoners of

war apply.

Since

the 18th century these have gradually been established along
the lines that war captivity

is

neither revenge nor punishment,

but solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to
prevent the prisoners of war from further participation in the
war. This principle was developed in accordance with the
view held by all armies that it is contrary to military tradition
to

kill

or injure helpless

people

.

.

.

The

decrees for the

treatment of Soviet prisoners of war enclosed are based on a

fundamentally different view-point."

This protest, which correctly stated the legal posiThe defendant Keitel made a
tion, was ignored.
note on this memorandum:
"The

objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous

This is the destruction of an ideology.
approve and back the measures."

warfare.

Therefore

I

:

:
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(B)

MURDER

AND

ILL-TREATMENT
POPULATION

OF

CIVILIAN

Article 6 (b) of the Charter provides that "ill-treat-

ment

*

*

*

pied territory

of civilian population of or in occu*
*
*
*
*
* killing of hostages

wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages" shall
be a war crime. In the main, these provisions are
merely declaratory of the existing laws of war as expressed by the Hague Convention, Article 46, which
stated
"Family honor and

and private
convictions and practice, must be

rights, the lives of persons

property, as well as religious
respected."

The

territories

occupied by

istered in violation of the laws
is

Germany were adminThe evidence
of war.

quite overwhelming of a systematic rule of violence,

brutality,

and

terror.

On

Hitler issued the directive since

und Nebel Erlass"

December 1941,
known as the "Nacht

the 7th

(night and fog decree), under

which persons who committed offenses against the
Reich or the German forces in occupied territories,
except where the death sentence was certain, were
to be taken secretly to Germany and handed over to
the SIPO and SD for trial or punishment in Germany.
This decree was signed by the defendant Keitel.
After these civilians arrived in Germany, no word of
them was permitted to reach the country from which
they came, or their relatives even in cases when they
died awaiting trial the families were not informed,
the purpose being to create anxiety in the minds of
the family of the arrested person. Hitler's purpose
in issuing this decree was stated by the defendant
;

Keitel in a covering letter, dated 12

December

1941,

to be as follows

and enduring intimidation can only be achieved
either by capital punishment or by measures by which the rela"Efficient
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and the population do not know the fate of
This aim is achieved when the criminal is trans-

tives of the criminal

the criminal.
ferred to

Germany."

Even persons who were only suspected of opposing
any of the policies of the German occupation authorwere arrested, and on arrest were interrogated
by the Gestapo and the SD in the most shameful
manner. On the 12th June 1942, the chief of the
SIPO and SD published, through Mueller, the
Gestapo chief, an order authorizing the use of "third
degree" methods of interrogation, where preliminary
investigation had indicated that the person could
give information on important matters, such as
subversive activities, though not for the purpose of
ities

extorting confessions of the prisoner's

own

crimes.

This order provided:
"*

*

Third degree may, under this supposition, only be
employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah's Witnesses,
saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, parachute agents, antisocial elements, Polish or Soviet Russian
loafers or tramps; in all other cases my permission must first be
*
*
*
Third degree can, according to circumobtained
stances, consist amongst other methods of very simple diet
(bread and water), hard bunk, dark cell, deprivation of sleep,
exhaustive drilling, also in flogging (for more than twenty
strokes a doctor must be consulted)."
*

The brutal suppression of all opposition to the
German occupation was not confined to severe measures against suspected members of resistance movements themselves, but was
families.

the

SIPO

also

extended to their

On

the 19th July 1944, the commander of
and SD in the district of Radom, in

Poland, published an order, transmitted through the
higher SS and police leaders, to the effect that in all
cases of assassination or attempted assassination of

Germans, or where saboteurs had destroyed
installations,

vital

not only the guilty person, but also
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all his

or her male relatives should be shot, and female

relatives over 16 years of age

tion camp.

The

*

*

put into a concentra-

*

practice of keeping hostages to prevent and to

punish any form of civil disorder was resorted to by
the Germans; an order issued by the defendant Keitel
on the 16th September 1941, spoke in terms of fifty
or a hundred lives from the occupied areas of the
Soviet Union for one German life taken. The order
stated that "it should be remembered that a human
countries frequently counts for
life in unsettled
nothing, and a deterrent effect can be obtained only
by unusual severity." The exact number of persons
killed as a result of this policy is not known, but
large numbers were killed in France and the other
occupied territories in the west, while in the east the
slaughter was on an even more extensive scale.
In
addition to the killing of hostages, entire towns were
destroyed in some cases; such massacres as those of
Oradour-sur-Glane in France and Lidice in Czechoslovakia, both of which were described to the Tribunal
in detail, are examples of the organized use of terror
by the occupying forces to beat down and destroy all
opposition to their rule.

One

most notorious means of terrorizing the
occupied territories was the use of concen-

of the

people in

They were first established in Germoment of the seizure of power by the

tration camps.

many

at the

Nazi Government. Their original purpose was to
imprison without trial all those persons who were
opposed to the Government, or who were in any way

German

With the aid of a
secret police force, this practice was widely extended,
and in course of time concentration camps became

obnoxious to

authority.

and systematic murder, where
millions of people were destroyed.

places of organized

In the administration of the occupied territories the
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concentration camps were used to destroy all opposition groups.
The persons arrested by the Ges-

tapo were as a rule sent to concentration camps.
They were conveyed to the camps in many cases
without any care whatever being taken for them,

and great numbers died on the way. Those who
arrived at the camp were subject to systematic
cruelty.
They were given hard physical labor,
inadequate food, clothes, and shelter, and were
times to the rigors of a soulless regime,
and the private whims of individual guards. * * *
subject at

all

A certain number of

the concentration camps were

equipped with gas chambers for the wholesale destruction of the inmates, and with furnaces for the
burning of the bodies. Some of them were, in fact,
used for the extermination of Jews as part of the
"final solution" of the Jewish problem.
Most of the
non-Jewish inmates were used for labor, although the
conditions under which they worked made labor
and death almost synonymous terms. Those inmates who became ill and were unable to work were
either destroyed in the gas chambers or sent to special
infirmaries, where they were given entirely inadequate medical treatment, worse food, if possible, than
the working inmates, and left to die.
The murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations reached its height in the treatment of the
*
*
*
citizens of the Soviet Union and Poland.
The foregoing crimes against the civilian population are sufficiently appalling, and yet the evidence
shows that at any rate in the east, the mass murders
and cruelties were not committed solely for the
purpose of stamping out opposition or resistance to
the German occupying forces. In Poland and the
Soviet Union these crimes were part of a plan to
get rid of whole native populations by expulsion and
annihilation, in order that their territory could be

"
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used

colonization

for

by Germans.

"Mein Kampf" on these
plan was clearly stated by Himmler
when he wrote:
written in

"It
is

is

lines,

in

had

and the

July 1942,

not our task to Germanize the east in the old sense, that

to teach the people there the

man

Hitler

law, but to see to

it

German language and

the Ger-

that only people of purely Germanic

blood live in the east."

(C)

PILLAGE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

Hague Convention provides that

Article 49 of the

an occupying power may levy a contribution of
money from the occupied territory to pay for the
needs of the army of occupation, and for the adArticle 52

ministration of the territory in question.

Hague Convention provides that an occupying
power may make requisitions in kind only for the
needs of the army of occupation, and that these
of the

requisitions shall be in proportion to the resources

These

of the country.

Articles, together

48, dealing with the expenditure of
in taxes,

and Articles

S3, 55,

and

with Article

money

collected

56, dealing

with

make it clear that under the rules
economy of an occupied country can only

public property,
of war, the

be required to bear the expense of the occupation,
and these should not be greater than the economy of
the country can reasonably be expected to bear.
Article 56 reads as follows:
"The property

of

municipalities,

of

religious,

charitable,

educational, artistic, and scientiiic institutions, although be-

longing to the State,

is

to be accorded the

premeditated

private

property.

damage

of such institutions, historical

art,

and

The
that

science,

is

All

same standing

seizure,

destruction

monuments, works

as

or
of

prohibited and should be prosecuted.

evidence in this case has established, however,

the

territories

occupied

by Germany were
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German war

exploited for the

effort in

the most

way, without consideration of the local
economy, and in consequence of a deliberate design
and policy. There was in truth a systematic "plunder
of public or private property," which was criminal
under Article 6 (b) of the Charter. * * *
ruthless

SLAVE LABOR POLICY

(D)

Article 6 (b) of the Charter provides that the "ill-

treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose, of civilian population of or in occupied
territory" shall be a war crime. The laws relating
to forced labor by the inhabitants of occupied territories are found in Article 52 of the Hague Convention, which provides:
"Requisition in kind and services shall not be demanded from
municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the
of occupation.

They

shall

army

be in proportion to the resources of

the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military operations

against their

The

own

country."

policy of the

German occupation

authorities

was

terms of this convention.
Some idea of this policy may be gathered from the
statement made by Hitler in a speech on November
9, 1941
in flagrant violation of the

:

*

which now works for us contains more than
250,000,000 men, but the territory which works indirectly for us
includes now more than 350,000,000.
In the measure in which
it concerns German territory, the domain which we have taken
under our administration, it is not doubtful that we shall succeed
in harnessing the very last man to this work."

"The

territory

The

actual results achieved were not so complete as

this,

but the German occupation authorities did suc-

ceed in forcing

many

pied territories to

of the inhabitants of the occu-

work

for the

German war

effort,
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and

in deporting at least 5,000,000

many

to serve

German

person to Ger-

industry and agriculture.

In the early stages of the war, manpower in the
occupied territories was under the control of various
occupation authorities, and the procedure varied

from country to country. In all the occupied
tories compulsory labor service was promptly
tuted.

terri-

insti-

Inhabitants of the occupied countries were

work in local occupaIn many
tions, to assist the German war economy.
cases they were forced to work on German fortifications and military installations.
As local supplies of
raw materials and local industrial capacity became
inadequate to meet the German requirements, the
system of deporting laborers to Germany was put
conscripted and compelled to

By

into force.

the middle of April 1940 compulsory

deportation of laborers to
in the

Germany had been

Government General; and

was followed
occupied.

in

*
(E)

*

ordered

a similar procedure

other eastern territories as they were
*

PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS

The persecution of the Jews at the hands of the
Nazi Government has been proved in the greatest
detail before the Tribunal.

It

is

a record of consistent

and systematic inhumanity on the greatest scale.
Ohlendorf, chief of Amt III in the RSHA from 1939
to 1943, and who was in command of one of the
Einsatz groups in the campaign against the Soviet
Union testified as to the methods employed in the
extermination of the Jews. He said that he employed
firing

squads to shoot the victims in order to lessen

the sense of individual guilt on the part of his men;
and the 90,000 men, women, and children who were

murdered

in

mostly Jews.

1

year by his particular group were
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When

the witness Bach-Zelewski was asked how
Ohlendorf could admit the murder of 90,000 people,

he replied:
"I

am

of the opinion that when, for years, for decades, the

preached that the Slav race is an inferior race, and
Jews not even human, then such an outcome is inevitable. ,,
doctrine

is

But the defendant Frank spoke the final words
this chapter of Nazi history when he testified

of
in

this court:

"We
for

have fought against Jewry; we have fought against it
years; and we have allowed ourselves to make utterances and

my own
tion

diary has become a witness against

—utterances

years will

me

which are terrible * *
pass and this guilt of Germany

*

in this connec-

.A

will

thousand

still

not be

erased."

The

anti-Jewish policy was formulated in point

4 of the party program which declared, "Only a
member of the race can be a citizen. A member of
the race can only be one who is of German blood,
without consideration of creed. Consequently, no
Jew can be a member of the race." Other points of
the program declared that Jews should be treated as
foreigners, that they should not be permitted to hold
public office, that they should be expelled from the
Reich if it were impossible to nourish the entire
population of the State, that they should be denied
any further immigration into Germany, and that
they should be prohibited from publishing German
newspapers. The Nazi Party preached these doc"Der Stuerner" and
trines throughout its history.
other publications were allowed to disseminate
hatred of the Jews, and in the speeches and public
declarations of the Nazi leaders, the Jews were held
up to public ridicule and contempt.

With the

seizure of power, the persecution of the

Jews was intensified. A series of discriminatory laws
was passed, which limited the offices and professions
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permitted to Jews; and restrictions were placed on
their family life and their rights of citizenship.
By the autumn of 1938, the Nazi policy toward the

Jews had reached the stage where it was directed
toward the complete exclusion of Jews from German
life.
Pogroms were organized, which included the
burning and demolishing of synagogues, the looting
of Jewish businesses, and the arrest of prominent
Jewish businessmen. A collective fine of 1 billion
marks was imposed on the Jews, the seizure of Jewish
assets

was

was authorized, and the movement of Jews

restricted

by

regulations

to

certain

specified

and hours. The creation of ghettoes was
carried out on an extensive scale, and by an order of
the security police Jews were compelled to wear a
yellow star to be worn on the breast and back.
It was contended for the prosecution that certain
aspects of this anti-Semitic policy were connected
districts

with the plans for aggressive war.
The violent
measures taken against the Jews in November 1938
were nominally in retaliation for the killing of an
official of

the

German Embassy

in Paris.

But the

decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia

had

been made a year before. The imposition of a fine of
1 billion marks was made, and the confiscation of the
financial holdings of the Jews was decreed, at a time
when German armament expenditure had put the
German treasury in difficulties, and when the reduction of expenditure on armaments was being considered. These steps were taken, moreover, with the
approval of the defendant Goering, who had been
given responsibility for economic matters of this
kind, and who was the strongest advocate of an
extensive rearmament program notwithstanding the
financial difficulties.

The Nazi

*

*

*

persecution of Jews in Germany before
the war, severe and repressive as it was, cannot com-
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pare, however, with the policy pursued during the

war

in

the

occupied

territories.

Originally

the

policy was similar to that which had been in force

Germany.

Jews were required to register,
were forced to live in ghettoes, to wear the yellow
star, and were used as slave laborers.
In the summer of 1941, however, plans were made for the "final
solution" of the Jewish question in Europe. This
inside

"final solution"

meant the extermination

of the Jews,

which early in 1939 Hitler had threatened would be
one of the consequences of an outbreak of war, and a
special section in the Gestapo under Adolf Eichmann,
as head of section B-4. of the Gestapo, was formed to
carry out the policy.

The plan

Jews was developed
shortly after the attack on the Soviet Union. Einsatzgruppen of the security police and SD, formed for
the purpose of breaking the resistance of the population of the areas lying behind the German armies in
the east, were given the duty of exterminating the
Jews in those areas. The effectiveness of the work
of the Einsatzgruppen is shown by the fact that in
February 1942, Heydrich was able to report that
Esthonia had already been cleared of Jews and that
in Riga the number of Jews had been reduced from
29,500 to 2,500. Altogether the Einsatzgruppen
for exterminating the

operating in the occupied Baltic States killed over
135,000 Jews in 3 months.
Nor did these special units operate completely

independently of the German armed forces. There
is clear evidence that leaders of the Einsatzgruppen
obtained the cooperation of army commanders. In
one case the relations between an Einsatzgruppe and
the military authorities was described at the time as
being "very close, almost cordial"; in another case
the smoothness of an Einsatzcommando's operation
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was attributed to the "understanding for
*
cedure" shown by the army authorities.
(F)

this pro*

*

THE LAW RELATING TO WAR CRIMES AND
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
and

[After quoting Article 6 (b)

(c) of

the Charter,

the Tribunal continued:]

The Tribunal

bound by the
Charter, in the definition which it gives both of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. With respect
to war crimes, however, as has already been pointed
out, the crimes defined by Article 6, section (b), of
the Charter were already recognized as war crimes
under international law. They were covered by
Articles 46, 50, 52, and 56 of the Hague Convention
of 1907, and Articles 2, 3, 4, 46, and 51 of the Geneva
Convention of 1929. That violation of these pro*

*

*

is

of course

which the guilty individuals were punishabletis too well settled to admit
of argument.
But is is argued that the Hague Convention does
not apply in this case, because of the "general participation" clause in Article 2 of the Hague Convenvisions constituted crimes for

tion of 1907.

"The

That

clause provided:

provisions contained in the regulations (rules of land

warfare) referred to in Article

I

as well as in the present con-

vention do not apply except between contracting powers, and

then only

if all

the belligerents are parties to the convention."

Several of the belligerents in the recent

war were not

parties to this convention.

In the opinion of the Tribunal
to decide this question.

The

not necessary
rules of land warfare
it is

expressed in the convention undoubtedly represented

an advance over existing international law at the
time of their adoption. But the convention expressly
stated that it was an attempt "to revise the general
laws and customs of war," which it thus recognized
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to be then existing, but

by 1939 these

rules laid

down

convention were recognized by all civilized
nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of
the laws and customs of war which are referred to in
in the

Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

A further

submission was

no longer bound by the

made

Germany was
warfare in many

that

rules of land

of the territories occupied during the war, because

Germany had completely subjugated those countries and incorporated them into the German Reich,
a fact which gave Germany authority to deal with
the occupied countries as though they were part of

Germany.

In the view of the Tribunal

it is

unneces-

sary in this case to decide whether this doctrine of

upon military conhas any application where the subjugation is

subjugation, dependent as
quest,

it

is

the result of the crime of aggressive war.

The

doc-

was never considered to be applicable so long as
there was an army in the fl^ld attempting to restore
the occupied countries to their true owners, and in
trine

this case, therefore, the doctrine could

not apply to

any territories occupied after the 1st September 1939.
As to the war crimes committed in Bohemia and
Moravia, it is a sufficient answer that these territories
were never added to the Reich, bur a mere protectorate was established over them.
With regard to crimes against humanity, there is
no doubt whatever that political opponents were
murdered in Germany before the war, and that many
of them were kept in concentration camps in circumstances of great horror and cruelty. The policy of
terror was certainly carried out on a vast scale, and
in many cases was organized and systematic.
The
policy of persecution, repression, and murder of
civilians in

were

Germany

likely to

ruthlessly

be hostile to

carried

war of 1939, who
the Government, was most

before the

out.

The

persecution

of

Jews

283
during the same period is established beyond all
doubt. To constitute crimes against humanity, the
acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have
been in execution of, or in connection with, any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and horrible
as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of,
or in connection with, any such crime. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a general declaration
that the acts before 1939 were crimes against humanity within the meaning of the Charter, but
from the beginning of the war in 1939 war crimes
were committed on a vast scale, which were also
crimes against humanity; and insofar as the inhumane

and committed

after

the beginning of the war, did not constitute

war

acts charged in the indictment,

crimes, they were

all

committed

in execution of, or

in connection with, the aggressive war,

and therefore

constituted crimes against humanity.

The Accused Organizations
[After referring to Articles 9

the Tribunal continued
*

*

*

The

and 10 of the Charter,

:]

effect of the declaration of criminali-

ty by the Tribunal is well illustrated by law No. 10
of the Control Council of Germany passed on the
20th day of December 1945, which provides:

*****
*****

"Each
"(d)

of the following acts

Membership

tioned

recognized as a crime:

in categories of a criminal

zation declared criminal

"(3)

is

by the International Military Tribunal.

Any person found guilty of any of
may upon conviction be punished

777534—48

19

group or organi-

the crimes above

men-

as shall be determined
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by the Tribunal to be just. Such punishment may
one or more of the following:
(a)

Death.

(b)

Imprisonment

for life or a

consist of

term of years, with or without

hard labor.
(c)

Fine, and imprisonment with or without hard labor, in

lieu thereof."

In effect, therefore, a

member

of an organization

which the Tribunal has declared to be criminal

may

be subsequently convicted of the crime of membership and be punished for that crime by death.
This
is not to assume that international or military courts
which will try these individuals will not exercise
appropriate standards of justice. This is a farreaching and novel procedure. Its application, unless properly safeguarded, may produce great injustice.

Article 9,

it

should be noted, uses the words "The

Tribunal may declare," so that the Tribunal is
vested with discretion as to whether it will declare
any organization criminal. This discretion is a
judicial one and does not permit arbitrary action,
but should be exercised in accordance with wellsettled legal principles, one of the most important

which is that criminal guilt is personal, and that
mass punishments should be avoided. If satisfied
of the criminal guilt of any organization or group,
of

Tribunal should not hesitate to declare it to be
criminal because the theory of "group criminality"
is new, or because it might be unjustly applied by
some subsequent tribunals. On the other hand, the
Tribunal should make such declaration of criminality
this

so far as possible in a

manner

to insure that innocent:

persons will not be punished.

A

conspiracy
for

analogous to a criminal,
that the essence of both is cooperation

criminal organization
in

criminal

purposes.

is

There must

be

a

group-
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bound together and organized for a common purpose.
The group must be formed or used in connection
with the commission of crimes denounced by the
Since the declaration with respect to the

Charter.

organizations and groups

will,

as has

been pointed

members, that definition
should exclude persons who had no knowledge of the
criminal purposes or acts of the organization and
those who were drafted by the State for membership, unless they were personally implicated in thecommission of acts declared criminal by Article 6
out, fix the criminality of its

Charter as members of the organization.
Membership alone is not enough to come within the
of

the

scope of these declarations.
Since declarations of criminality which the Tri-

bunal makes will be used by other courts in the trial
of persons on account of their membership in the
organizations found to be criminal, the Tribunal feels
it

appropriate to

tions
1.

make

the following

recommenda-

:

That

so far as possible throughout the four

zones of occupation in
sanctions,

Germany

the classifications,

and penalties be standardized. Uniformity

of treatment so far as practical should be a basic-

This does not, of course, mean that
discretion in sentencing should not be vested in the
court; but the discretion should be within fixed
limits appropriate to the nature of the crime.
2. Law No. 10, to which reference has already been

principle.

made, leaves punishment entirely in the discretion
of the trial court even to the extent of inflicting the
death penalty.

The

March

however, passed for Bavaria, Greater-Hesse, and Wuerttemberg-Baden, provides definite sentences for punde-Nazification law of

5,

1946,

each type of offense. The Tribunal
recommends that in no case should punishment im—

ishment

in
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posed under law No. 10 upon any members of an
organization or group declared by the Tribunal to
be criminal exceed the punishment fixed by the deNazification

No

law.

person should be punished

under both laws.
3. The
Tribunal recommends to the Control
Council that law No. 10 be amended to prescribe
limitations on the punishment which may be imposed for membership in a criminal group or organization so that such punishment shall not exceed the
punishment prescribed by the de-Nazification law.
The indictment asks that the Tribunal declare
to be criminal the following organizations: The
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Tarty; the Gestapo;
the SD; the SS; the SA; the Reich Cabinet, and the
General Staff and High Command of the German

Armed
(A)

*

Forces.

.

.

.

THE LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY
*

*

Conclusion.

—The Leadership Corps was

used for purposes which were criminal under the Charter and involved the Germanization of incorporated
territory, the persecution of the Jews, the administra-

and the mistreatment
The defendants Bormann and

tion of the slave labor program,
of prisoners of war.

who were members of this organization,
were among those who used it for these purposes.
The Gauleiters, the Kreisleiters, and the OrtsgrupSauckel,

penleiters participated, to one degree or another, in

these criminal programs.
staff

The

Reichsleitung as the

organization of the party

for these criminal

programs

is

also responsible

as well as the heads of

the various staff organizations of the Gauleiters and
Kreisleiters.

The

decision of the Tribunal on these

staff organizations includes

only the Amtsleiters

who

were heads of offices on the staffs of the Reichsleitung,
Gauleitung, and Kreisleitung. With respect to other
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and party organizations attached to the
Leadership Corps other than the Amtsleiters referred
staff officers

to above, the Tribunal will follow the suggestion of the

prosecution in excluding

The Tribunal
meaning

them from the

declares to be criminal within the

of the Charter the group

members

declaration.

composed of those

Corps holding the positions enumerated in the preceding paragraph who
became or remained members of the organization with
knowledge that it was being used for the commission
of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter,
or who were personally implicated as members of the
organization in the commission of sucn crimes. The
of the Leadership

basis of this finding

is

the participation of the organi-

war crimes and crimes against humanity

zation in

connected with the war; the group declared criminal
cannot include, therefore, persons who had ceased
to hold the positions enumerated in the preceding
paragraph prior to 1 September 1939.
(B)

*

*

*

GESTAPO AND SD

Conclusion.

—The Gestapo and SD were

used for purposes which were criminal under the
Charter involving the persecution and extermination
of the Jews, brutalities and killings in concentration
camps, excesses in the administration of occupied
territories,

the

administration

of

the

slave

program, and the mistreatment and murder of
oners of war. The defendant Kaltenbrunner,

was

a

member

who used

of this organization,

labor
pris-

who

was among those

In dealing with the
Gestapo the Tribunal includes all executive and
administrative officials of Amt IV of the RSHA or
it

for these purposes.

concerned with Gestapo administration in other
departments of the RSHA and all local Gestapo
officials serving both inside and outside of Germany,
including the members of the frontier police, but not
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including the

members

protection or the

members

as

secret

have been

and customs

of the border
field

police,

specified above.

except such

At

the suggestion of the prosecution the Tribunal does not
include persons employed by the Gestapo for purely
clerical, stenographic, janitorial, or similar unofficial

routine tasks.

In dealing with the

Amter
other members

III,

includes

SD

VI, and VII of the

the Tribunal

RSHA

and

all

SD, including all local representatives and agents, honorary or otherwise, whether
they were technically members of the SS or not, but
not including honorary informers who were not members of the SS, and members of the Abwehr who were
transferred to the SD.

The

of the

tribunal declares to be criminal within the

meaning of the charter the group composed of those
members of the Gestapo and SD holding the positions
enumerated in the preceding paragraph who became
or remained members of the organization with
knowledge that it was being used for the commission
of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter,
or who were personally implicated as members of the
organization in the commission of such crimes.
basis

for

this

finding

is

the participation

organization in war crimes and crimes against

of

The
the

human-

connected with the war; this group declared
criminal cannot include, therefore, persons who had
ceased to hold the positions enumerated in the preceding paragraph prior to 1 September 1939.

ity

(c)

the

ss

—The

SS was utilized for
purposes which were criminal under the Charter
involving the persecution and extermination of the
Jews, brutalities and killings in concentration camps,
*

*

*

Conclusions.

excesses in the administration of occupied territories,
the administration of the slave labor program and the
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mistreatment and murder of prisoners of war. The
defendant Kaltenbrunner was a member of the SS
In dealing with the
implicated in these activities.
SS the Tribunal includes all persons who have been
officially accepted as members of the SS including the
members of the Allgemeine SS, members of the Waffen
SS, members of the SS Totenkopf Verbaende and the
members of any of the different police forces who were
members of the SS. The Tribunal does not include
the so-called SS riding units. The Sicherheitsdienst
des Reichsfuehrer SS (commonly known as the SD) is
dealt with in the Tribunal's judgment on the Gestapo
and SD.
The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the
meaning of the Charter the group composed of those
persons who had been officially accepted as members
of the SS as enumerated in the preceding paragraph
who became or remained members of the organization with knowledge that it was being used for the
commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of
the Charter, or who were personally implicated as
members of the organization in the commission of
such crimes, excluding, however, those who were
drafted into membership
as to give

them no choice

by the State

in the matter,

committed no such crimes.
is

in

The

such a

way

and who had

basis of this finding

the participation of the organization in war crimes

.and 'crimes against

humanity connected with the war;

group declared criminal cannot include, therefore, persons who had ceased to belong to the organizations enumerated in the preceding paragraph prior
to 1 September 1939.
this

(D)

*

on June

*

Conclusion.

—Until

the purge beginning

SA was a group composed in large
and bullies who participated in the

30, 1934, the

part of ruffians

THE SA
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Nazi outrages of that period.

It has not

been shown,

however, that these atrocities were part of a specific
plan to wage aggressive war, and the Tribunal therefore cannot hold that theoe activities were criminal
under the Charter. After the purge, the SA was
reduced to the status of a group of unimportant Nazi

Although in specific instances some units
of the SA were used for the commission of war crimes
and crimes against humanity, it cannot be said that
its members generally participated in or even knew
of the criminal acts. For these reasons, the Tribunal
does not declare the SA to be a criminal organization
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Charter.
hangers-on.

(E)

The

THE REICH CABINET

prosecution has

named

as a criminal organiza-

tion the Reich Cabinet (Die Reichsregierung) con-

members of the ordinary cabinet after January 30, 1933, members of the council of ministers for
the defense of the Reich and members of the secret
cabinet council. The Tribunal is of opinion that no
declaration of criminality should be made with respect
sisting of

to the Reich Cabinet for

two reasons:

(1)

Because

it

not shown that after 1937 it ever really acted as a
group or organization; (2) because the group of persons here charged is so small that members could be
conveniently tried in proper cases without resort to
a declaration that the Cabinet of which they were
is

members was criminal.
As to the first reason

for our decision,

it is

to be

observed that from the time that it can be said that
a conspiracy to make aggressive war existed the
Reich Cabinet did not constitute a governing body,
but was merely an aggregation of administrative officers subject to the absolute control of Hitler.

Not

a

meeting of the Reich Cabinet was held after
1937, but laws were promulgated in the name of one

single
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The Secret Cabinet
number of the cabinet

or more of the cabinet members.

Council never met at

all.

A

members were undoubtedly involved in the conspiracy to make aggressive war; but they were involved as individuals, and there is no evidence that
the cabinet as a group or organization took any part
in these crimes.
It will be remembered that when
Hitler disclosed his aims of criminal aggression at the
Hossbach Conference, the disclosure was not made
before the cabinet and that the cabinet was not consulted with regard to

it,

but, on the contrary, that

it

was made secretly to a small group upon whom
Hitler would necessarily rely in carrying on the war.
Likewise no cabinet order authorized the invasion of
Poland.
testifies

to the

On

the contrary, the defendant Schacht

that he sought to stop the invasion by a plea

commander

in chief of the

army that

order was in violation of the constitution

Hitler's

because

not authorized by the cabinet.

however, that various laws authorizing acts which were criminal under the Charter
were circulated among the members of the Reich
Cabinet and issued under its authority signed by the
members whose departments were concerned. This
does not, however, prove that the Reich Cabinet,
after 1937, ever really acted as an organization.
As to the second reason, it is clear that those members of the Reich Cabinet who have been guilty of
crimes should be brought to trial; and a number ^g)f
them are now on trial before the Tribunal. It is
estimated that there are 48 members of the group,
It does appear,

that 8 of these are dead and 17 are
ing only 23 at the most, as to

could have any importance.

now on

trial,

leav-

whom the declaration
Any others who are

guilty should also be brought to trial; but nothing

would be accomplished to expedite or facilitate their
trials by declaring the Reich Cabinet to be a criminal

—
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Where an

organization.

membership

is

organization with a large

used for such purposes, a declaration

obviates the necessity of inquiring as to

character in the later

members who are
through membership in

criminal purposes and thus saves

Staff

acits

much time and

There is no such advantage
small group like the Reich Cabinet.

trouble.

The

criminal

trial of

cused of participating

(F)

its

in the case of a

GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND

prosecution has also asked that the General

and High

Command

of

German armed
organization.
The

the

be declared a criminal
Tribunal believes that no declaration of criminality
should be made with respect to the General Staff and
forces

High Command.

The number

of persons charged,

while larger than that of the Reich Cabinet,
small that individual

trials

is still

of these officers

so

would

accomplish the purpose here sought better than a
declaration such as is requested. But a more compelling reason is that in the opinion of the Tribunal
the General Staff and High Command is neither an
"organization" nor a "group" within the meaning
of those terms as used in Article 9 of the Charter.
Some comment on the nature of this alleged group
is requisite.
According to the indictment and evidence before the Tribunal, it consists of approximately 130 officers, living and dead, who at any
ti£>\e during the period from February 1938, when
Hitler reorganized the armed forces, and May 1945,

when Germany

surrendered, held certain positions

These men were highranking officers in the three armed services: OKH
Above
army,
navy, and OKL air force.
them was the over-all armed forces authority,
high command of the German armed forceswith Hitler as the supreme commander. The officers
in

the military hierarchy.

OKM—

OKW—

—
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in the

OKW,

the high

including defendant Keitel as chief of

command, were

in a sense Hitler's personal

In the larger sense they coordinated

star!.

and

directed the three services, with particular emphasis

on the functions

The

of planning

and operations.

individual officers in this alleged group were,

at one time or another, in one of four categories:
(1)
(2)

Commanders

in chief of

one of the three services;

chief of staff of one of the three services; (3)

"Oberbefehlshabers," the

field

commanders

in chief

of one of the three services, which of course comprised

by

far the largest

OKW

number

of these persons; or (4)

an

which there were three, defendants
Keitel and Jodl, and the latter's deputy chief, Warlimont. This is the meaning of the indictment in its
use of the term "General Staff and High Command."
officer, of

The

prosecution has here drawn the

line.

The

prosecution does not indict the next level of the

commanders of army
corps, and equivalent ranks in the navy and air force,
nor the level below, the division commanders or

military hierarchy consisting of

their equivalent in the other branches.

the four staff

officers of

OKM,

OKL are not included,

and

specialists

commands

who were

of

And

the staff

OKW, OKH,

nor are the trained

customarily called General Staff

officers.

In

effect, then,

those indicted as

members

are mili-

tary leaders of the Reich of the highest rank.
serious effort

was made to assert that they composed

an "organization"
assertion
is

a wider

is

No

in

the sense of Article

9.

The

rather that they were a "group," which

and more embracing term than "organiza-

tion."

,

The Tribunal does not

so find.

According to the

evidence, their planning at staff level, the constant

conferences

between

staff

officers

manders, their operational technique

comthe field and

and
in

field
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was much the same as that of the
armies, navies, and air forces of all other countries.
The over-all effort of
at coordination and direction could be matched by a similar, though not
identical form of organization in other military forces,
such as the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of
at headquarters

OKW

Staff.

To

derive from this pattern of their activities the

existence of an association or group does not, in the

opinion of the Tribunal, logically follow. On such a
theory the top commanders of every other nation are

what they actumilitary men, a number

just such an association rather than
ally are,

an aggregation of

of individuals

who happen

at a given period of time

to hold the high-ranking military positions.

Much

and the argument has centered around the question of whether membership in
these organizations was or was not voluntary; in
this case, it seems to the Tribunal to be quite beside
the point. For this alleged criminal organization has
one characteristic, a controlling one, which sharply
distinguishes it from the other five indicted. When
an individual became a member of the SS for instance,
he did so, voluntarily or otherwise, but certainly
with the knowledge that he was joining something.
In the case of the General Staff and High Command,
however, he could not know he was joining a group
of the evidence

or organization for such organization did not exist

except in the charge of the indictment. He knew
only that he had achieved a certain high rank in one

and could not be conscious of
the fact that- he was becoming a member of anything
so tangible as a "group," as that word is commonly

of the three services,

His relations with his brother officers in his
own branch of the service and his association with
those of the other two branches were, in general,
like those of other services all over the world.
used.
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The Tribunal
eral

therefore does not declare the

and High

Staff

Command

to

Gen-

be a criminal

organization.

Although the Tribunal is of the opinion that the
term "group" in Article 9 must mean something
more than this collection of military officers, it has
heard

much

evidence as to the participation of these

planning and waging aggressive war, and
in committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. This evidence is, as to many of them, clear
officers in

and convincing.
They have been responsible in large measure for
the miseries and suffering that have fallen on millions
of men, women, and children. They have been a
disgrace to the honorable profession of arms.
Without their military guidance the aggressive ambitions
of Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been academic and sterile. Although they were not a group
falling within the words of the Charter, they were
certainly

a

ruthless

military caste.

The contem-

porary German militarism flourished briefly with
its recent ally, National Socialism, as well as or better
than it had in the generations of the past.

Many

of these

men have made

a

mockery

of the

oath of obedience to military orders. When
it suits their defense they say they had to obey;
when confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes, which
are shown to have been within their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed.
The truth is they
soldier's

actively participated in

all

these crimes, or sat silent

and acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes
on a scale larger and more shocking than the world
has ever had the misfortune to know. This must
be said.
Where the facts warrant it, these men should be
brought to trial so that thosejamong them who are
guilty of these crimes should not escape punishment..
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The Accused Individuals
Article 26 of the Charter provides that the judg-

ment

of theTribunal as to the guilt or innocence of

any defendant

shall give the reasons

on which

it is

based.

The Tribunal
claring

its

will

now

state those reasons in de-

judgment on such

guilt

or innocence.

[The Tribunal's discussion of the cases
against the individual defendants, except those
against Doenitz and Raeder, is omitted.]

Doenitz
Doenitz is indicted on counts one, two, and three.
In 1935 he took command of the first U-boat flotilla
commissioned since 1918, became in 1936 Commander
of the submarine arm, was made Vice Admiral in
1940, Admiral in 1942, and on January 30, 1943

Commander

May

1945, he

became the

Hitler.

Crimes against peace.
trained the

German Navy. On 1
Head of State, succeeding

in Chief of the

—Although Doenitz built and

German U-boat arm,

the evidence does

not show he was privy to the conspiracy to wage
aggressive wars or that he prepared and initiated

He was a line officer performing
duties.
He was not present at the

such wars.

strictly

important conferences when plans for aggressive wars
were announced, and there is no evidence he was informed about the decisions reached there. Doenitz
did, however, wage aggressive war within the meanSubmarine
ing of that word as used by the Charter.
warfare which began immediately upon the outbreak
of war, was fully coordinated with the other branches
of the Wehrmacht.
It is clear that his U-boats,
few in number at the time, were fully prepared to
tactical

wage war.
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It

is

1943 as

true that until his appointment in January

Commander

Chief he was not an "OberBut this statement under-estimates

befehlshaber."

in

He was no

the importance of Doenitz' position.

mere army or division commander. The U-boat
arm was the principal part of the German fleet and
Doenitz was its leader. The High Seas Fleet made
a

few minor,

if

spectacular, raids during the early

years of the war but the real

damage

to the

enemy

was done almost exclusively by his submarines as the
millions of tons of allied and neutral shipping sunk
Doenitz was solely in charge of this
will testify.
warfare. The naval war command reserved for itonly the decision as to the number of submarines
In the invasion of Norway, for exin each area.
self

made recommendations

ample, Doenitz

October
1939 as to submarine bases, which he claims were no
more than a staff study, and in March 1940 he made
out the operational orders for the supporting U-boats
as discussed elsewhere in this judgment.
in

importance to the German war effort
was so regarded is eloquently proved by Raeder's
recommendation of Doenitz as his successor and his
appointment by Hitler on 30 January 1943, as

That

his

Commander

in

Chief of the Navy.

Hitler too

knew

that submarine warfare was the essential part of

Germany's naval warfare.
From January 1943, Doenitz was consulted almost
continuously by Hitler. The evidence was that they
conferred on naval problems about 120 times during
the course of the war.

As

late as April 1945,

when he admits he knew

the struggle was hopeless, Doenitz as
in

Chief urged the

May

Navy

to continue

became the Head

Commander
its fight.
On

its

and as
such ordered the Wehrmacht to continue its war in
the east, until capitulation on 9 May 1945. Doenitz
1

1945, he

of State
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explained that his reason for these orders was to
insure that the German civilian population might

be evacuated and the army might make an orderly
retreat from the east.
In the view of the Tribunal, the evidence shows
that Doenitz was active in waging aggressive war.
War crimes. Doenitz is charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the Naval
Protocol of 1936, to which Germany acceded, and
which reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare laid

—

down in the London Naval Agreement of 1930.
The prosecution has submitted that on 3 September 1939, the German U-boat arm began to wage
unrestricted submarine warfare

upon

all

merchant

whether enemy or neutral, cynically disregarding the Protocol; and that a calculated effort
was made throughout the war to disguise this pracships,

tice

by making

hypocritical references to international

law and supposed violations by the Allies.
Doenitz insists that at all times the Navy remained
within the confines of international law and of the
Protocol.
He testified that when the war began,
the guide to submarine warfare was the German
prize ordinance taken almost literally from the
Protocol, that pursuant to the German view, he
ordered submarines to attack all merchant ships in
convoy, and all that refused to stop or used their
radio upon sighting a submarine.
When his reports
indicated that British merchant ships were being
used to give information by wireless, were being
armed, and were attacking submarines on sight, he
ordered his submarines on 17 October 1939, to attack
all enemy merchant ships without warning on the
ground that resistance was to be expected. Orders
already had been issued on 21 September 1939, to
attack

all

without

ships, including neutrals, sailing at night

lights in the English

Channel.
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On

24 November 1939, the German Government
issued a warning to neutral shipping that, owing to
the frequent engagements taking place in the waters
around the British Isles and the French coast between U-boats and Allied merchant ships which
were armed and had instructions to use those arms
as well as to ram U-boats, the safety of neutral ships
in those waters could no longer be taken for granted.

On

January 1940, the German U-boat command,
acting on the instructions of Hitler, ordered U-boats
to attack all Greek merchant ships in the zone surrounding the British Isles which was banned by the
United States to its own ships and also merchant ships
1

of every nationality in the limited area of the Bristol

Channel.

Five days

to U-boats to
of

later, a further

"make immediately

weapons against

all

order was given
unrestricted use

North
Finally on

ships" in an area of the

which were defined.
the 18th of January 1940, U-boats were authorized
to sink, without warning, all ships "in those waters
near the enemy coasts in which the use of mines
can be pretended." Exceptions were to be made in
the cases of United States, Italian, Japanese, and
Sea, the limits of

Soviet ships.

war the British
Admiralty, in accordance with its Handbook of
Instructions of 1938 to the merchant navy, armed
its merchant vessels, in many cases convoyed them
with armed escort, gave orders to send position
reports upon sighting submarines, thus integrating
Shortly after the outbreak of

merchant

warning network of naval
intelligence.
On 1 October 1939, the British Admiralty announced that British merchant ships had
been ordered to ram U-boats if possible.
In

vessels into the

the

Tribunal

actual
is

—

777534

circumstances

of

this

case,

the

not prepared to hold Doenitz guilty for his
48

20
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conduct of submarine warfare against British armed
merchant ships.
However, the proclamation of operational zones
and the sinking of neutral merchant vessels which
enter

those

zones

presents

a

different

question.

This practice was employed in the war of 1914-18
by Germany and adopted in retaliation by Great

The Washington

Britain.

London Naval Agreement

conference of 1922, the

and the protocol
of 1936 were entered into with full knowledge that
such zones had been employed in the First World
War. Yet the protocol made no exception for
operational zones. The order of Doenitz to sink
neutral ships without warning when found within
of 1930,

these zones was, therefore, in the opinion of the

Tribunal, a violation of the protocol.
It

is

also asserted that the

German U-boat arm

not only did not carry out the warning and rescue
provisions of the protocol but that Doenitz deliberately

ordered

wrecked

vessels,

the

killing

of

survivors

of

ship-

whether enemy or neutral. The

prosecution has introduced
ing two orders of Doenitz,

much

evidence surround-

war order No.

154, issued

and the so-called "Laconia" order of 1942.
The defense argues that these orders and the evidence supporting them do not show such a policy
and introduced much evidence to the contrary. The
in 1939,

Tribunal

is

of the opinion that the evidence does not

establish with the certainty required that Doenitz

deliberately ordered the killing of shipwrecked survivors.

The

orders were undoubtedly ambiguous,

and deserve the strongest censure.
The evidence further shows that the rescue provisions were not carried out and that the defendant
ordered that they should not be carried out. The
argument of the defense is that the security of the

submarine

is,

as the first rule of the sea,

paramount
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to rescue and that the development of aircraft

may

made

but the protocol
If the commander cannot rescue, then
is explicit.
under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel
and should allow it to pass harmless before his
These orders, then, prove Doenitz is
periscope.
rescue impossible.

This

be

so,

guilty of a violation of the protocol.

proved and in particular
of an order of the British Admiralty announced on 8
May 1940, according to which all vessels should be
sunk at night in the Skagerrak, and the answers to
interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz stating that
unrestricted submarine warfare was carried on in
the Pacific Ocean by the United States from the
first day that Nation entered the war, the sentence
of Doenitz is not assessed on the ground of his
breaches of the international law of submarine
In view of

all

of the facts

warfare.

Doenitz was also charged with responsibility for
Hitler's commando order of 18 October 1942.
Doenitz admitted he received and knew of the order
when he was flag officer of U-boats, but disclaimed
responsibility.
He points out that the order by its
express terms excluded men captured in naval warfare, that the navy had no territorial commands on
land, and that submarine commanders would never
encounter commandos.
In one instance, when he was Commander in
Chief of the Navy, in 1943, the members of the crew
of an Allied motor torpedo boat were captured by
German naval forces. They were interrogated for
intelligence purposes on behalf of the local Admiral,
and then turned over by his order to the SD and
shot.
Doenitz said that if they were captured by
the Navy their execution was a violation of the

commando
nounced

order,

in the

that the execution was not an-

Wehrmacht communique, and

that
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he was never informed of the incident. He pointed
out that the Admiral in question was not in his
chain of command, but was subordinate to the
Army general in command of the Norway occupaBut Doenitz permitted the order to remain
tion.
in full force when he became Commander in Chief,
and to that extent he is responsible.
Doenitz, in a conference of 11 December 1944,
said, " 12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be
employed in the shipyards as additional labor."
At this time Doenitz had no jurisdiction over shipyard construction, and claims that this was merely
a suggestion at the meeting that the responsible
officials do something about the production of ships,
that he took no steps to get these workers since it
was not a matter for his jurisdiction and that he does
not know whether they ever were procured.
He
admits he knew of concentration camps. A man in
his position must necessarily have
known that
citizens of occupied countries in large numbers were
confined in the concentration camps.
In 1945, Hitler requested the opinion of Jodl and
Doenitz whether the Geneva Convention should be
denounced. The notes of the meeting between the
two military leaders on 20 February 1945, show that
Doenitz expressed his view that the disadvantages
of such an action outweighed the advantages. -The
summary of Doenitz' attitude shown in the notes
taken by an officer, included the following sentence:
"It would be better to carry out the -measures considered

necessary without warning, and at

all

costs to save face with

the outer world."

The

"the measures"
referred to meant the Convention should not be
The
denounced, but should be broken at will.
defense explanation is that Hitler wanted to break
prosecution

insisted

that
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the Convention for two reasons: to take

German

away from

troops the protection of the Convention,

thus preventing them from continuing to surrender

groups to the British and Americans; and
also to permit reprisals against Allied prisoners of
war because of Allied bombing raids.
Doenitz
claims that what he meant by "measures" were disciplinary measures against German troops to prevent
them from surrendering, and that his words had no
reference to measures against the Allies; moreover,
that this was merely a suggestion, and that in any
in large

event no such measures were ever taken, either
against Allies or Germans. The Tribunal, however,
does not believe this explanation.
The Geneva

Convention was not, however, denounced by Ger-

many. The defense has introduced

several affidavits

to prove that British naval prisoners of

war

in

camps

under Doenitz' jurisdiction were treated strictly
according to the Convention, and the Tribunal
takes this fact into consideration, regarding

it

as a

mitigating circumstance.
Conclusion.

—The

Tribunal finds Doenitz

guilty on count one of the indictment,

on counts two and

and

is

is

not

guilty

three.

RAEDER
Raeder

is

indicted on counts one, two, and three.

In 1928 he became Chief of Naval Command and in
1935 Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (OKM);
in 1939 Hitler made him Gross Admiral.
He was a

Reich Defense Council.
On 30
January 1943, Doenitz replaced him at his own request, and he became Admiral Inspector of the
Navy, a nominal title.
Crimes against peace. In the IS years he commanded it, Raeder built and directed the German
Navy; he accepts full responsibility until retirement

member

of

the

—
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He

admits the navy violated the Versailles
Treaty, insisting it was "a matter of honor for every
in 1943.

man"

do so, and alleges that the violations were
for the most part minor, and Germany built less than
her allowable strength.
These violations, as well
as those of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of
1935, have already been discussed elsewhere in this
judgment.
Raeder received the directive of 24 June 1937,
from von Blomberg, requiring special preparations
for war against Austria.
He was one of the five
leaders present at the Hossbach Conference of 5
November 1937. He claims Hitler merely wished
to

by this conference to spur the army to
armament, insists he believed the questions

faster reof Austria

and Czechoslovakia would be settled peacefully, as
they were, and points to the new Naval treaty with
England which had just been signed. He received
no orders to speed construction of U-boats, indicating
that Hitler was not planning war.
Raeder received directives on "Fall Gruen" and
the directives on "Fall Weiss" beginning with that
of 3 April 1939; the latter directed the navy to
support the army by intervention from the sea. He
was also one of the few chief leaders present at the
meeting of 23 May 1939. He attended the Obersalzburg briefing of 22 August 1939.

The conception
arose in the

mind

of the invasion

of

Norway

first

Raeder and not that of Hitler.
desire, as shown by his directive
of

Despite Hitler's
of October 1939, to keep Scandinavia neutral, the
Navy examined the advantages of naval bases there
Admiral Karls originally sugas early as October.
gested to Raeder the desirable aspects of bases in

A

October 1939,
which sought comments on the desirability of such

Norway.
bases,

questionnaire, dated

was circulated within SKL.

3

On

10 October,
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Raeder discussed the matter with Hitler; his war
diary entry for that day says Hitler intended to give
A few months later
the matter consideration.
Hitler talked to Raeder, Quisling, Keitel, and Jodl;.
began its planning and the Naval War Staff
staff officers.
Raeder received
worked with
Keitel's directive for Norway on 27 January 1940,
and the subsequent directive of 1 March, signed

OKW

OKW

by

Hitler.

Raeder defends

move

on the ground

his actions

it

was a

not necessary
again to discuss this defense, which has heretofore
been treated in some detail, concluding that Gerto forestall the British.

many's

invasion

aggressive war.
said:

of

is

Norway and Denmark was

of

In a letter to the Navy, Raeder

"The operations

Norway

It

of the

Navy

in the

occupation

time remain the great contrito this war."

will for all

bution of the

Navy

Raeder received the directives, including the innumerable postponements, for the attack in the west.
In a meeting of 18

March

the occupation of

all

1941 with Hitler he urged

Greece.

He

claims this was

only after the British had landed and Hitler had
ordered the attack, and points out the navy had no
interest in Greece.

He

received Hitler's directive

on Yugoslavia.
Raeder endeavored to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon the invasion of the USSR. In September 1940 he urged on Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy as an alternative to an attack on Russia.

On

November

war against England "as our main enemy" and that submarine and
14

1940, he urged the

naval air force construction be continued.
"serious objections

He voiced

against the Russian campaign

before the defeat of England," according to notes of

the

German naval war

tions were based

staff.

He

claims his objec-

on the violation of the Non-Aggres-
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sion Pact as well as strategy.

But once the

decision

had been made, he gave permission 6 days before
the invasion of the Soviet Union to attack Russian
submarines in the Baltic Sea within a specified warning area and defends this action because these submarines were "snooping" on German activities.
It is clear from this evidence that Raeder participated in the planning and waging of aggressive war.
War crimes. Raeder is charged with war crimes
on the high seas. The Athenia, an unarmed British
passenger liner, was sunk on 3 September 1939, while
outward bound to America. The Germans 2 months
later charged that Mr. Churchill deliberately sank
the Athenia to encourage American hostility to
Germany. In fact, it was sunk by the German
U-boat 30. Raeder claims that an inexperienced
U-boat commander sank it in mistake for an armed
merchant cruiser, that this was not known until the
U-30 returned several weeks after the German denial
and that Hitler then directed the Navy and Foreign
Office to continue denying it.
Raeder denied knowledge of the propaganda campaign attacking Mr.
Churchill.
The most serious charge against Raeder
is that he carried out unrestricted submarine warfare,
including sinking of unarmed merchant ships, of
neutrals, nonrescue and machine-gunning of sur-

—

vivors,

contrary to the London Protocol of 1936.

The Tribunal makes
this

charge as

it

the same finding on Raeder on

did as to Doenitz, which has already

been announced, up until 30 January 1943, when
Raeder retired.
The commando order of 18 October 1942, which
expressly did hot apply to naval warfare, was transmitted by the Naval War Staff to the lower naval
commanders with the direction it should be distrib-

:
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and section commanders
Two commandos were put to
to their subordinates.
death by the Navy, and not by the SD, at Bordeaux
on 10 December 1942. The comment of the Naval
War Staff was that this was "in accordance with the
Fuehrer's special order, but is nevertheless something
new in international law, since the soldiers were in
uniform." Raeder admits he passed the order down
through the chain of command, and he did not
uted orally by

flotilla

leaders

object to Hitler.
Conclusion.

—The

Tribunal finds that Raeder

guilty on counts one, two,
1

and

*

*

*

October 1946

/s/

Geoffrey

Law-

/s/
/s/

/s/

rence, President
Francis Biddle
H. Donnedieu De

/s/

three.

is

Vabres

/s/

Nikitchenko
Norman Birkett
John J. Parker
R. Falco

/s/

A.

/s/

Volchkov

Dissenting Opinion

The Tribunal decided
(a)

To

acquit the defendants Hjalmar Schacht,

Franz von Papen, and Hans Fritzsche.
(b) To sentence the defendant Rudolf Hess to
life imprisonment.
(c)

Not

zations

:

to declare .criminal the following organi-

the Reich Cabinet, General Staff and

OKW.

cannot agree with the decision
adopted by the Tribunal as it does not correspond
to the facts of the case and is based on incorrect
In this respect

conclusions.

Soviet

.

.

I

.

Member IMT, Major

General Jurispru-

dence.
[signed]
1

October 1946.

I.

T. Nikitchenko.
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Tabulation of Nurnberg Sentences
Defendants

—Individual

Count Count Count Count

Hermann Goering
Rudolf Hess

Joachim von Ribbentrop
Wilhelm Keitel
Ernst Kaltenbrunner
Alfred Rosenberg

1

2

C
C
c
c
A
C

c
c
c
c

A
A
A
A
A
A

Hans Frank
Wilhelm Frick
Julius Streicher

Walther Funk
Hjalmar Schacht
Karl Doenitz

c
c

c
C
C

Erich Raeder

C

A
A

A

Alfred Jodl

C

C

Martin Bormann
Franz von Papen
Arthur Seyss-Inquart
Albert Speer

A
A
A
A

Constantin von Neurath.

C

Hans

A

Fritzsche

C

C

A

A

Life.

C
C
C
C
C
C

C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C

Hanging.

C

C
C

Hanging.

Hanging.
Hanging.

Hanging.
Hanging.
Hanging.
Hanging.
Life.

Acquitted.

C
C
C
C
c

10 Years.
Life.

C
C
C
C

A
A

Sentence

4

A

Baldur von Schirach
Fritz Sauckel

3

20 Years.

Hanging.
Hanging.
Hanging.
Acquitted.

c
c
c

C
C
C

Hanging.

A

A

Acquitted.

20 Years.
15 Years.

A = acquitted.
C = convicted.

Indicted Groups and Organizations
Reich Cabinet

Not

Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party

Criminal

SS

{Schutzstaffeln), including

SA

(Sturmabteilung)

SD

(Sicherheitsdienst)

Gestapo {Geheime Staatspolizei)
General Staff and High Command of the Armed Forces

(22)

criminal.
in part.

Criminal.

Not

criminal.

Criminal.

Not

criminal.

Resolution of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, 11 December 1946
(Journal of the United Nations, No. 58, Supplement A, p. 485)

The General Assembly,
Recognizes the obligation laid upon it by Article
13, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph a of the Charter, to

